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mechanistic a standard as that of whether the weapon was
partially or fully concealed.
Narcotics
In State v. Barnes,18 Justice Barham rendered a dissent
pointing out that all of the cases which had read in the require-
ment of guilty knowledge or intent in connection with narcotics
statute violations "did so as a basis for allowing the State to
introduce evidence of the defendant's prior or subsequent con-
victions or other similar acts or offenses from which could be
inferred his guilty knowledge. . . ."19 He then complained
strongly about the refusal of the court to hold that a special
instruction should have been given, as requested, to unequiv-
ocally inform the jury that guilty knowledge is an essential
element for the crime of possession of narcotics. On rehearing,
which again affirmed the conviction, Justice Tate dissented,
strongly complaining about this failure to afford the defendant
the benefit of state of mind rules.20 This dissent reinforces the
view that "evidence" decisions have unduly modified substantive
criminal law and effectively caused the definitions of crimes and
defenses to be different for the prosecution and defense.21
MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION
Leila 0. Schroeder*
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
The Louisiana Employment Security Law is designed "to
provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining
purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences
of poor relief assistance."' The provisions of the statute are
liberally interpreted to give the greatest effect to the intent of
this social legislation.2
18. 257 La. 1017, 245 So.2d 159 (1971).
19. Id. at 1034, 245 So.2d at 165.
20. Id. at 1048, 245 So.2d at 171.
21. See text accompanying notes 3-11 supra for a discussion concerning
the history of the jurisprudence, recently followed in State v. Bolden, show-
ing that the Louisiana Supreme Court holdings on state of mind evidence
must be taken in the context of whether this evidence benefits the prosecu-
tion or the defense. State v. Barnes also makes this point.
*Assistant Professor of Finance, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 23:1471 (1950).
2. Smith v. Brown, 147 So.2d 452 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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This liberal construction continues with American Sugar Co.
v. Doyal,8 where the claimant was held entitled to unemploy-
ment compensation benefits although he was also entitled to a
lump sum payment under a guaranteed annual income clause in
his employment contract. The employment contract, which
guaranteed payment of the difference between what the worker
actually earned and the wages which the employer guaranteed
him was in effect during the period when the claimant was tem-
porarily laid off. The payment was made approximately one
month after the end of the contract year. The court found the
delay determinative, since to consider this payment as wages
would defeat the intent of maintaining "the stability of the state
and the family by assuring through weekly benefits the con-
tinued purchasing power of a worker during periods of unem-
ployment."4
The court had to examine the definition of "unemployment"
which contains a dual test: there must be no services performed
during the week, "and with respect to which no wages are pay-
able."5 Although claimants had to hold themselves available to
return to work, they were free to seek other employment, so this
availability was not considered "services." The lump sum pay-
ment was not paid "with respect to a particular week," and
therefore was not "wages."
Wages have been variously defined. Commissions, less busi-
ness expenses which the employee pays, are wages,7 while tips
are not.8 The distinction between these two is determined by
whether the employer pays the unemployment compensation
tax on the remuneration.9 Vacation or retirement pay can be
the equivalent of wages.' 0 Termination pay is not wages," al-
3. 237 So.2d 415 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
4. Id. at 417.
5. LA. R.S. 23:1472 (19) (1950).
6. "[All remuneration for services, including commissions and bonuses
and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash.
. . ." Id. § 1472(2)(A)20. The lump sum payment could come within this defi-
nition, although the claimant is "unemployed."
7. Motion Pictures Advertising Serv. Co. v. Sharp, 101 So.2d 455 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1958).
8. Doyal v. Roosevelt Hotel, 234 So.2d 510 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
9. Id. at 514.
10. American Sugar Co. v. Brown, 193 So.2d 326 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
This case is discussed at 28 LA. L. REV. 378 (1968).
11. George v. Brown, 144 So.2d 140 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Accord,
Indus. Comm. of Colorado v. Sirokman, 134 Colo. 481, 306 P.2d 669 (1957).
The payments were called "termination pay" In the former case, "separation
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though severance payments may be so construed if the employer
is legally obligated to make them. 12 However, in the latter case,
severance payments do not disqualify a claimant for benefits
unless they are paid "with respect to" a particular week, thus
meeting the dual test for unemployment.
The employer who believes that a labor contract which pro-
vides for a guaranteed annual wage, payable in spite of a lay-
off, will be his only "compensation" to employees will find that
he is mistaken. Unemployment compensation benefits may also
be payable, and these are debited to the employer's experience
rating and can increase his contribution rate or, at least inhibit
its reduction. Although this seems to be a double payment,
"'double payment could only exist where the payments are for
the same thing, same period of time, same consideration, same
scope and nature.' "13 The employer, along with the consumer
to whom these added costs are passed, subsidizes this protection
against one of the risks common to all workers.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Melvin G. Dakin*
ZONING
In Moncla v. City of Lafayette," a property owner success-
fully attacked the validity of a zoning ordinance. Although within
the appeal time the city might have adopted a regular ordinance
to replace the one invalidated, its response instead was to enact
a new temporary emergency ordinance and thereafter to adopt
a permanent one pursuant to regular delays provided in the city
charter. The property owner made an application for a building
permit varying from the emergency zoning ordinance and upon
denial, obtained a court order invalidating the ordinance on the
ground that no emergency existed; a court of appeal affirmed.
A dissenting judge urged the need to protect citizens against
zoning violations during the adoption of a permanent ordinance
allowances," in the latter; but both were a form of remuneration for services
rendered prior to separation from employment. The courts look at the na-
ture of the payment and when it is made.
12. Swift & Co. v. Brown, 132 So.2d 508 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). These
were dismissal payments which the employing unit was legally required to
make. See LA. R.S. 23:1472(20)(C)(III) (1970).
13. Swift & Co. v. Brown, 132 So.2d 508, 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 241 So.2d 307 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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